America is leading a dangerous global slide towards subsidies, export controls and protectionism
美正在引全球走向、出口管制及保主的危滑坡。
(援用自原文)
Since 1945 the world economy has run according to a system of rules and norms underwritten by America. This brought about unprecedented economic integration that boosted growth, lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty and helped the West prevail over Soviet Russia in the cold war.
打1945年以，世界一直按照一，由美署的及系行。了，促成，使人困，及在冷中助西方，之前所未有的整合。
Today the system is in peril. Countries are racing to subsidize green industry, lure manufacturing away from friend and foe alike and restrict the flow of goods and capital. Mutual benefit is out and national gain is in. An era of zero-sum thinking has begun.
目前，系於危中。各正相色，引造朋友及人手中走，限制商品及本的流。互利不在，在的是家利益。一零和思的代，已始。
The old system was already under strain, as America’s interest in maintaining it waned after the global financial crisis of 2007-09. But President Joe Biden’s abandonment of free-market rules for an aggressive industrial policy has dealt it a fresh blow. America has unleashed vast subsidies, amounting to $465bn, for green energy, electric cars and semiconductors.
系已於力之下。因，在2007-09年全球金融危之後，美它的趣弱。不，了一激的政策，美·拜登放自由市，已它新的打。色能源、汽及半，美已出了，4650美元的巨。
These are laced with requirements that production should be local. Bureaucrats tasked with scrutinising inward investments to prevent undue foreign influence over the economy now themselves hold sway over sectors making up 60% of the stockmarket. And officials are banning the flow of ever more exports—notably of high-end chips and chipmaking equipment to China.
些生是地的需求混在一起。查外投，以防止外生不影的官僚，在於成60%股市的部，本身有支配。因此，官正在禁止，越越多出口品的去向。特是，高端的晶片及晶片造流向中。
For many in Washington, muscular industrial policy holds a seductive appeal. It could help seal America’s technological ascendancy over China, which has long pursued self-sufficiency in vital areas using state intervention.
在盛的多人，硬的政策具有一人的吸引力。可能有助於保美，在多重要域，期以一直用家干，求自自足之中的技。
As carbon pricing is politically unfeasible, it could foster decarbonization. And it reflects a hope that government intervention might succeed where private enterprise failed, and reindustrialize America’s heartlands.
由於碳定在政治上是行不通的，不能促碳。因此反映了一，政府干，在私企失的地方可能成功，及再工化美心地的可能性。
The immediate consequence, however, has been to set off a dangerous spiral into protectionism worldwide. Build a chipmaking plant in India and the government will stump up half the cost; build one in South Korea and you can avail yourself of generous tax breaks.
不，直接後果已持在全球引了，一危的保主漩。在印度建一晶片造，政府承一半的用；在建一，能享受慷慨的。
Should seven other market economies that have announced policies for “strategic” sectors since 2020 match America’s spending as a share of GDP, total outlays would reach $1.1trn. Last year nearly a third of the cross-border business deals that came to the attention of European officials received detailed scrutiny.
倘若，打2020年以，已“策略”部宣布政策的其他七市，美之支出生毛(GDP：Gross Domestic Product)的比例相匹配，支出到1.1兆美元。去年，引起洲官注意的跨境商交易中，有近三分之一遭的查。
Countries with the raw materials needed to make batteries are eyeing export controls. Indonesia has banned nickel exports; Argentina, Bolivia and Chile may soon collaborate, OPEC-style, on the output of their lithium mines.
有造池所需原材料的家，正密切注意多出口管制。印尼已禁止出口；阿根廷、玻利及智利可能很快，以石油出(OPEC：Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries)的式，其的量行合作。
Economic conflict with China looks increasingly inevitable. As China became more deeply integrated into the global economy at the turn of this century, many in the West predicted that it would become more democratic.
中的突，看日益不可避免。著中在本世之交，更深入融入全球。於西方多人，中得更民主。
The death of that hope—combined with the migration of a million manufacturing jobs to Chinese factories—caused America to fall out of love with globalisation. Today Mr Biden’s administration frets about the danger of depending on China for batteries the way Europe relied on Russia for gas before the invasion of Ukraine.
那希望的破(加上以百造工作，移到中工)致美不再全球化。目前，拜登政府心，有依中池，如同在入侵克之前，洲依俄斯天然之情的危性。
Democrats and Republicans alike worry that the loss of America’s lead in advanced chipmaking to Taiwan will undermine its ability to develop artificial intelligence—on which, they predict, armies of the future will rely to plan strategy and guide missiles.
民主及共和同心，美在先晶片造域的先地位台，削弱他展，其未的依，制定略及引之人工智能的能力。
Some simply want to stop China becoming too rich—as if impoverishing 1.4bn people were either moral or likely to ensure peace. Others, more wisely, focus on increasing America’s economic resilience and maintaining its military edge.
有些人只是想阻止中得於富裕。好像使14人陷入困，不是道德上的就是可能保和平一。明智的其他人著重於，增美的原力，及持其事。
A reindustrialisation of the heartland, they argue, will rekindle support for market capitalism. In the meantime, as the global hegemon, America can weather other countries’ complaints.
他，心地的再工化，再度激起市本主的支持。在此同，作全球霸主，美能得起其他家的抱怨。
This thinking is misguided. If zero-sum policies were seen as a success, abandoning them would only become harder. In reality, even if they do remake American industry, their overall effect is more likely to cause harm by corroding global security, holding back growth and raising the cost of the green transition.
想法是的。倘若零和政策被成功，放它只得更。事上，即使他重塑美工，他的整影也更可能，由於破全球安全、阻成及提高色型的成本，而造成害。
One problem is their extra economic costs. The Economist estimates that replicating the cumulative investments of firms in the global tech-hardware, green-energy and battery industries would cost $3.1trn-4.6trn (3.2-4.8% of global gdp).
一是其外的成本。《人》估，公司在全球技硬、色能源及池行的累投，花3.1兆到4.6兆(全球GDP的 3.2-4.8%)。
Reindustrialisation will raise prices, hurting the poor most. Duplicating green supply chains will make it costlier for America and the world to wean themselves off carbon. History suggests that vast amounts of public money could go to waste.
再工化提高格，人的害最大。美及世界而言，色供，使碳排放的成本更高。史示，大量公共可能浪掉。
Another problem is the fury of friends and potential allies. America’s genius after the second world war was to realize that its interests lay in supporting openness in global commerce. As a result it pursued globalisation despite, by 1960, making up nearly 40% of global dollar GDP.
另一是，朋友及在盟友的怒。在第二次世界大後，美的思潮是清，其利益在於支持全球商的放。因此，管到1960年，成全球美元GDP近40%，它也追求全球化。
Today its share of output has fallen to 25% and America needs friends more than ever. Its ban on exports to China’s chipmakers will work only if the Dutch firm ASML and Japan’s Tokyo Electron also refuse to supply them with equipment.
今，美生份已降到25%，因此其比以往任何候，更需要朋友。 只有倘若荷先半材料光刻公司(ASML：Advanced Semiconductor Material Lithography)及日本京子，也拒向中晶片造商供的情下，美它的出口禁令才奏效。
Battery supply chains will likewise be more secure if the democratic world operates as one bloc. Yet America’s protectionism is irking allies in Europe and Asia. America must also woo emerging powers. By 2050 India and Indonesia will be the world’s third- and fourth-largest economies, projects Goldman Sachs, a bank.
倘若民主世界作一集作，池供同更安全。然而，美的保主正在惹，於洲及洲的盟友。美也必拉新大。美高盛行估，到2050年，印度及印尼成世界第三及第四大。
Both are democracies but not close friends of America. By 2075 Nigeria and Pakistan will have gained economic clout, too. If America demands that other countries freeze out China without offering sufficient access to its own markets then it will be spurned by rising powers.
者都是民主家。不，都不是美的密朋友。到2075年，奈及利及巴基斯坦也得影力。倘若美要求其他家，中拒之外，不提供足之入自己市的，那它被崛起的大所唾。
A final worry is that the more economic conflict proliferates, the harder it becomes to solve problems that demand global collaboration. Despite racing to secure green technology, countries are squabbling over how to help the poor world decarbonise.
最後一是，突散得越多，解需要全球合作的得越。管各相取色技，不各仍在，如何助世界碳。
It is proving hard to rescue countries in debt distress, such as Sri Lanka, because of obstruction by China, a big creditor. If countries cannot co-operate to tackle some problems, these will become impossible to fix and the world will suffer accordingly.
由於中大的阻，正示以援助如斯里卡等，陷入困境的家。倘若各不能合作解一些，些成不可能解，因此世界依此遭受失。
Nobody expects America to go back to the 1990s. It is right to seek to preserve its military pre-eminence and to avoid a dangerous dependence on China for crucial economic inputs. Yet this makes other forms of global integration all the more essential.
人期待美回到1990 代。求持其事，及避免在的投入上，中的危依是正的。然而，使得其他形式的全球一，化得更加重要。
It should seek the deepest co-operation between countries that is possible, given their respective values. Today this probably requires a number of overlapping forums and ad hoc deals. America should, for instance, join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an Asian trade pact based on an earlier deal it helped write but then abandoned.
於各自的值，求，在可能的各之求最深入的合作。今天，可能需要一些重的市，及前需要的交易。譬如，美加入《跨太平洋夥伴的全面步定》，是一根其助起草，不後被放之早期的洲易定。
Saving globalisation may seem impossible, given the protectionist turn in American politics. But Congress’s aid to Ukraine shows that voters are not insular. Surveys suggest the popularity of free trade is recovering. There are signs that the Biden administration is responding to allies’ concerns about its subsidies.
於美政治中，保主的向，拯救全球化似乎是不可能的。不，美克的援助，示民非是孤立的。多查示，自由易的受迎程度正恢中。有多拜登政府正，盟友其之，作出反的象。
Yet rescuing the global order will require bolder American leadership that once again rejects the false promise of zero-sum thinking. There is still time for that to happen before the system collapses completely, damaging countlss livelihoods and imperilling the causes of liberal democracy and market capitalism.
然而，拯救全球秩序需要，更大的美，再次拒零和思的承。在此系底崩、害生和危及自由民主市本主的理想之前，需生那情。
The task is enormous and urgent; it could hardly be more important. The clock is ticking.
任巨且迫;它再重要不了。正不流逝中。
址：https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/01/12/the-destructive-new-logic-that-threatens-globalisation
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