＊ 合新／合 2010/12/05
基解密公的美外交密示，Google之前被，中共中央政治局常委委李春及和周永康有（中央即胡）。
一封由美大使於2009年5月18日府的密，引述「熟知情」的消息人士之言，某位中高在「Google」了自己名字後，面，即心整Google。
密中未指明是「高」，，位高就是李春。李春在Google批他（同僚）的文章，因此加施Google，Google展商。
今年初，生中客攻Google，入侵美人人士的e-mail事件。基解密的另外一份文件示，中客攻是在李春及周永康直接下行的。周永康任中共政法委。
基解密始人中
＊ 美之音中文／者申 2010/12/05
社目前密切注的基解密（WikiLeaks）新事件，在中和阿拉伯世界不多。不，家站始人阿桑奇（Julian Paul Assange）不及中。
中：不要相信
美等西方家政府密集理基解密事件及其效之，中官方日前就基解密表短。法新社援引中外交部言人姜瑜星期四的，基解密公的某些涉及中的美外交容「法令人置信」。不她拒就所涉及的具容加以，外交部另外一位言人洪磊先前也表了似的。
法新社，基解密目前公的部分容示：中北非法出口零部件「置若罔」；中高曾下令Google上攻；另外，有中官，中的盟友北是「一了的孩子」等等。
中封
中在基解密事件最近涉及中後，很快在境路上通「城防火」封了家境外站。盛，基解密公的美外交，在中和阿拉伯世界有受。北美中文世界日，凡是在中想接基解密站，得到的通知都是「重新」。中球暗示，基解密是「覆」中的成部分。
阿桑奇中
示，基解密站始人阿桑奇注中，他在接受代刊，希望以揭露美的方式，揭露中和俄斯的「秘密」。不他，最封的社，其改革力最大，也就是，中要比美更容易改革。阿桑奇，中政府和公安看怕言自由，而正是一的象，明政治言依然能在中引起革。
基解密
朱欣欣是立中文成，原河北人民播台新部。他，在中只有通翻才能登入基解密站，到家站作用，他美之音：「是肯定的，一方面掌者和政局，他是力。另外公民社的民，也是一很大的助。因它能一步清，北京的一些策程，以及策者的一些真想法，我也能取一些相的策。」
朱欣欣，基解密公的所涉及的不是公民人：「基解密所揭密的都是集，不是公民人的，主要的是掌者、位高重的人、一些政者。他些人，他有所忌，有所忌，否他的力很容易侵犯到公民，他有束」。
中版揭密
富比士北京者站人加迪波斯坦在他的博客上，一批中人活人士明年六月一建立通一中版的基解密站，不阿桑奇似乎表示，「此非常危」，希望中人活人士，能和基解密站合作。因他希望更多能中文的人和他身合作，因只有他的站具有可信的。
中後作
此同，所「基暴」正在上酵。各相家外交官「心肉跳」。世界日，不少中官「人心惶惶」，有中官心掉帽，送去大牢。
目前各方拭目以待的是，基解密如果安然渡眼下暴後，是否像其宣的那，公7倍於目前量的美防部文件。
The dangers of a rising China
Dec 2nd 2010 | ECONOMIST
China and America are bound to be rivals, but they do not have to be antagonists
TOWARDS the end of 2003 and early in 2004 China’s most senior leaders put aside the routine of governing 1.3 billion people to spend a couple of afternoons studying the rise of great powers. You can imagine history’s grim inventory of war and destruction being laid out before them as they examined how, from the 15th century, empires and upstarts had often fought for supremacy. And you can imagine them moving on to the real subject of their inquiry: whether China will be able to take its place at the top without anyone resorting to arms.
In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly promised that it means only peace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces and international organisations. When North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour.
But reasonable China sometimes gives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to issue any condemnation. A few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming Japanese coastguard vessels around some disputed islandsand then it locked up some Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vital for Japanese industry. And it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea.
As the Chinese leaders’ history lesson will have told them, the relationship that determines whether the world is at peace or at war is that between pairs of great powers. Sometimes, as with Britain and America, it goes well. Sometimes, as between Britain and Germany, it does not.
So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has devoted itself to economic growth, American security has focused on Islamic terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a waning power that will eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscovered economic and military might, will express itself (see ECONOMIST’s special report).
The Peloponnesian pessimists
Pessimists believe China and America are condemned to be rivals. The countries’ vsions of the good society are very different. And, as China’s power grows, so will its determination to get its way and to do things in the world. America, by contrast, will inevitably balk at surrendering its pre-eminence.
They are probably right about Chinese ambitions. Yet China need not be an enemy. Unlike the Soviet Union, it is no longer in the business of exporting its ideology. Unlike the 19th-century European powers, it is not looking to amass new colonies. And China and America have a lot in common. Both benefit from globalisation and from open markets where they buy raw materials and sell their exports. Both want a broadly stable world in which nuclear weapons do not spread and rogue states, like Iran and North Korea, have little scope to cause mayhem. Both would lose incalculably from war.
The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats and rows will sour relations between China and America, just as the friendship between Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is already happening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite weapons. Now America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China’s military strength warn of the threat to Taiwan and American bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast. The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in the Pacific. Feeling threatened anew, China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harmif they wanted only to ensure their own securityeach could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.
Some would say the solution is for America to turn its back on military rivalry. But a weaker America would lead to chronic insecurity in East Asia and thus threaten the peaceful conduct of trade and commerce on which America’s prosperity depends. America therefore needs to be strong enough to guarantee the seas and protect Taiwan from Chinese attack.
How to take down the Great Wall
History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it can rise unhindered and the incumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accompanied by a build-up of trust.
There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus be more open about its military doctrineabout its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme. Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including North Korea (see article), Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength.
America and China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today’s confusion of competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the East Asia Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders.
If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it promotes, it needs to stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks themby, for instance, protectionismit feeds China’s suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.
China and America have one advantage over history’s great-power pairings: they saw the 20th century go disastrously wrong. It is up to them to ensure that the 21st is different.
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